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"[Self-defense is the] primary Canon of the Law of Nature."
-John Adams, 1770'
"A people who would stand fast in their liberty, should furnish
themselves with weapons proper for their defence .... "
-Rev. Simeon Howard's sermon to the Ancient and Honorable
Artillery Company, Boston 1773'
"[In free governments] there is not the least difficulty or jealousy about
putting arms into the hands of every man in the country."3
-Daniel Dulany Jr., 1774
INTRODUCTION
A. THE "STANDARD MODEL" OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme Court
struck down the Washington, D.C. gun bans and endorsed the "Standard
Model" view of the Second Amendment.* That view interprets the
Amendment as a guarantee that law-abiding, responsible adults may
acquire and possess firearms.5 The term "Standard Model" was coined by
University of Tennessee constitutional law professor Glenn H. Reynolds
* Yale, LI.B., 1966.
** Sonoma State University, M.A., History, 1998; B.A., History, 1994.
The Authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful advice of Nicholas Johnson, C.B. Kates, Michael
A. Lawrence, Nelson Lund, and George A. Moesary. For errors the Authors alone are responsible.
I. JAMES GRANT, JOHN ADAMS: PARTY OF ONE 95 (2005).
2. Rev. Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company in
Boston 0773), in ON FAITH AND FREE GOVERNMENT 99, 1o8 (Daniel C. Palm ed., '997).
3. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS 50 (2008) (quoting DANIEL DULANY JR., CONSIDERATIONS ON THE MEASURES CARRYING ON
wrmH RESPECT TO THE BRrISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA 57 (R. Baldwin ed., 1774)).
4. See 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822-23 (2008).
5. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461,
465-.66 (995).6. Id. at 463.
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to reflect two facts: first, an individual right is clearly what the
Amendment's rights clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed"7) guarantees, at least in the context of a Bill
of Rights in which "right of the people" is repeatedly used to denote
individual rights;8 and, second, the overwhelming majority of scholarly
treatments are in agreement that that is what the Second Amendment
guarantees.9 This remains the consensus among scholars despite the
antigun lobby's generous financing of three minor law reviews to publish
symposia in which only pieces opposing the Standard Model were
allowed."0 Indeed, the term "Standard Model" has now been accepted
even by vigorous opponents of that model."
B. UNELABORATED EXCEPTIONS
The slip opinion of the Heller majority devotes sixty-four pages to
extended discussion of the text, legislative history, and historical
background of the Second Amendment. Understandably, it omits any
lengthy analysis of extraneous issues, stating:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill ....
7. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("right of the people peaceably to assemble"); id. amend. IV ("right
of the people to be secure.., against unreasonable searches"); id. amend. IX (reserving the rights of
the people to the people themselves); cf. id. amend. X (reserving the "powers" of the states to the
states themselves or to the people). It has been observed that "as used throughout the Constitution,
'the people' have 'rights' and 'powers,' but federal and state governments only have 'powers' or
'authority', never 'rights."' Emerson v. United States, 270 F.3 d 203, 228 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added).
9- The most recent assessment of which we are aware is: "Suffice it to say that the historical
evidence so heavily favors a non-State-centric -either an individual-rights or standard-model-
approach, as reflected in the recent scholarship, that courts and others cannot help but conclude that
the Second Amendment protects a right of the people...." Michael A. Lawrence, Second
Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due
Process Clauses, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2007) (footnote omitted).
io. See Posting of Randy Barnett to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/
archive_200504_Io-2oo5_o4_i6.shtml#i 113332569 (Apr. 12, 2005, 3:02 pm); Posting of David Hardy
to Of Arms and the Law, http://armsandthelaw.com/archives/2oo5/o4/joyce-foundatio.php (Apr. 3,
2005, 2:32 pmo). We are, however, informed that in each of the later Symposia a single advocate of the
Standard Model view was approached to provide an appearance of balance. See Posting of Randy
Barnett to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive-2005-04-o-200504-
16.shtml#iil3414313 (Apr. 13, 2005, 1:45 pmo).
i i. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CoNsT. COMMENT.
221, 229 (I999); John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment and the Failure
of Originalism, 40 BRAN EIS L.J. 659, 694 (2002); Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REv.
BooKs, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62.
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Justice Breyer chides us for.., not providing extensive historical
justification for those regulations of the right that we describe as
permissible. But since this case represents this Court's first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to
clarify the entire field .... [T]here will be time enough to expound
upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned
if and when those exceptions come before us.
The purpose of this Article is to elaborate on the two most
important exceptions which Heller intimated but did not address in
detail: (i) that the scope of the Second Amendment is limited to a right
to possess ordinary small arms for self-defense, not super-destructive
military weaponry that is too indiscriminate to use in legitimate self-
defense;'3 and (2) that the Amendment right extends only to responsible,
law-abiding adults but not to criminals, the insane, or juveniles. 4 (The
majority opinion also implies that the law could punish obtaining or
carrying a gun with the intent to use it for wrongful purposes. 5)
But before elaborating on those issues, we treat another point which
will undoubtedly be a major subject of discussion vis-h-vis the case's
result: that guaranteeing the right to arms of law-abiding, responsible
adults is fully consistent with the findings of modern criminological
research.
I. CRIMINOLOGICAL DIscuSSION
A. THE CANARD THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE MURDER
Though it doubtless will be so assailed, Heller's embrace of the
Standard Model cannot be deemed criminologically unsound in
recognizing a right of law-abiding, responsible adults to possess firearms.
For decades gun control advocates have blamed murder on ordinary
people, claiming that
most homicides are not committed by the "hardened" criminal who
would seek out a gun or other lethal weapon, whether or not it was
legal, but rather by ordinary, "law-abiding" citizens who kill on
impulse rather than by intent [because a firearm was available in a
moment of ungovernable anger].'6
12. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17, 2821 (2oo8) (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 2822.
14. Id. at 2816-17.
15. See id. at 2799.
6. AMITAI ETZIONI & RICHARD REMP, TECHNOLOGICAL SHORTCUTS TO SOCIAL CHANGE 107 (1973);
see, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, A Preliminary Consideration of Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers
Immunity Bill, 38 AKRON L. REV. 113, 1i8-I9 n.28 (2005) (citing as authoritative such unsupported
claims by Dr. Katherine Christoffel, who heads a gun-ban advocacy group, that "most shootings are
not committed by felons ... but are acts of passion that are committed using a handgun that is owned
for home protection" (alteration in original) (quoting Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing
Pediatric Injuries from Firearms: Charting a Legislative and Regulatory Course, 88 PEDIATRICS 294, 300
(I99i)); see also GREGG LEE CARTER & MILDRED VASAN, GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: A
June 2009]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
It bears emphasis that the passage thus quoted appeared naked of any
supporting criminological reference. That is a peculiarity of such claims
whenever and wherever they appear. Claims that-unlike burglars,
rapists, and robbers-most murderers are ordinary, previously law-
abiding people routinely appear in purportedly scholarly articles which
never supply supporting references -for there are none!
Perpetrator data dating back to the nineteenth century invariably
shows that murderers were not previously law-abiding, responsible
adults; rather, "most murderers differ little from other major criminals."'7
Perpetrator studies dating back to the nineteenth century invariably find
that the overwhelming majority of murderers have prior crime records;
this so well recognized by criminologists that it is now counted among the
"criminological axioms."' 8 But given the wide dissemination and political
importance of the ordinary-citizen-as-murderer canard, we briefly review
some of the more recent contributions to the vast corpus of contrary
criminological study conclusions:
* "[T]he vast majority of persons involved in life-threatening
violence have a long criminal record with many prior contacts
with the justice system."'9
" Homicide is usually part of a "pattern of violence," engaged in by
people who are known as violence prone.
2
0
" Psychological studies summarized as finding that 8o% to ioo% of
juvenile murderers are psychotic or have psychotic symptoms.'
" Though only 15% of Americans have criminal records, roughly
90% of adult murderers have adult records (exclusive of their
often extensive juvenile records), with an average adult crime
career of six or more years, including four major felonies.2
" A New York Times study of the 1662 murders in that city in the
years 2003 through 2005 found that "[m]ore than ninety percent
of the killers had criminal records.
23
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 239-40 (20o6) (noting that Dr. Christoffel is the founder and board president
of the Handgun Epidemic Lowering Plan).
17. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of High Out-of-State Prison Population
on State Homicide Rates, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 513, 517 (1998) (emphasis added). The study defines "major
criminal" as "similar to what others call professional criminals, career criminals, or violent predators."
Id. at 518 n.5.
18. David Kennedy & Anthony Braga, Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving, 2
HOMICIDE STUD. 263, 267 (z998).
19. Delbert S. Elliott, Life Threatening Violence Is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on
Prevention, 69 COLO. L. REv. lo8i, 1O93 (1998).
2o. GERALD D. ROBIN, VIOLENT CRIME AND GUN CONTROL 47 (1991).
21. Wade C. Myers & Kerrilyn Scott, Psychotic and Conduct Disorder Symptoms in Juvenile
Murderers, 2 HOMICIDE STUD. I6o, 170-73 (1998).
22. GARY KLECK & DON B. KATES, ARMED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GUN CONTROL 20-21 (2001).
23. Jo Craven McGinty, New York Killers, and Those Killed, by Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
[Vol. 6o:1339
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" "Some 95% of homicide offenders... [in a Kennedy School
study had been] arraigned at least once in Massachusetts courts
before they [murdered].... On average ... homicide offenders
had been arraigned for 9 prior offenses . ..,,"
" "A history of domestic violence was present in 95.8%" of the
intrafamily homicides studied. 5
" Of Illinois murderers in i991 through 2000, the great majority
had prior felony records. 6
" Eighty percent of 1997 Atlanta murder arrestees had previously
been arrested at least once for a drug offense, and 70% had three
or more prior drug arrests, in addition to all their arrests for
other crimes."
* Baltimore police records show that 92% of 2006 murder suspects
had criminal records.
* From a Milwaukee police compilation of data on 2007 and past
years' murders: "Most suspects had criminal records, and a
quarter of them were on probation or parole." 9
To reiterate, those who claim that many or most murderers are
ordinary, law-abiding, responsible adults never cite supporting evidence,
at least not evidence that is relevant and valid.30 The closest they come is
noting the bare facts that murders often involve people who knew each
other and arise from arguments and/or occur in homes.3' Those who
present these bare facts as proving that murderers are ordinary people
are apparently laboring under the delusion that criminals do not have
2006, at AI.
24. Anthony A. Braga et al., Understanding and Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and
Response Development in Lowell, Massachusetts, 9 POLICE Q. 20, 29-31 (2006).
25. Paige Hall-Smith et al., Partner Homicide in Context, 2 HOMICIDE STUD. 400,41o (I998).
26. Philip Cook et al., CRIMINAL RECORDS OF HOMICIDE OFFENDERS, 294 JAMA 598, 599-6o0
(2005).
27. Dean G. Rojek, The Homicide and Drug Connection, in THE VARIETIES OF HOMICIDE AND ITS
RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 MEETING OF THE HOMICIDE RESEARCH WORKING GROUP 124, 128
(Paul H. Blackman et al. eds., 2000).
28. Gus G. Sentementes, Patterns Persist in City Killings, BALT. SUN, Jan. I, 2007, at AI.
29. John Dietrich, Before the Next Bullet Kills, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 2007, at A1.
30. The one exception to this dearth of supporting references appeared in a pamphlet by the
then-Mayor of New York, a vehement anti-gun advocate, which asserted, without specifying any
particular documents, that 1972 FBI data showed that "most murders (73% in 1972) are committed by
previously law-abiding citizens." See JOHN V. LINDSAY, THE CASE FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS CONTROL 22
(1973).
The citation was fraudulent. The FBI never found any such thing either in that year or in any
other. What the FBI's 1972 Uniform Crime Report section titled "Careers in Crime" actually found
was that 74.7% of murder arrestees that year had one or more prior arrests for a violent felony or
burglary, exclusive of their arrests for other offenses. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1972, at 35-38
(I973)-
31. See, e.g., ROBERT SPrrZFR, THE POLmCS OF GUN CONTROL i86 (10995); Paul H. Blackman,
Letter to the Editor, 272 JAMA 14o6, 14o6-o9 (I994).
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homes or acquaintances or arguments. It is only by deduction from this
delusion that anyone could conclude that since murders involve these
things, the killers must be noncriminals. Of the many studies belying this,
the broadest analyzed a year's national data on gun murders that
occurred in homes between acquaintances, and concluded that "the most
common victim-offender relationship" was "where both parties knew
one another because of prior illegal transactions.""
In sum, guns or no guns, neither most murderers nor many
murderers-nor virtually any murderers-are ordinary, law-abiding,
responsible adults. To reiterate, this is so invariably established in
perpetrator studies that it is now recognized as among the standard
"criminological axioms."33
The policy implications are obvious: since ordinary people neither
rob nor murder, nor commit other gun crimes, there is no point in
disarming them. Rather, doing so is counterproductive since it leaves the
innocent defenseless against violent predators.
B. THE CRIMINOLOGY OF HELLER
The foregoing is amply borne out by Washington, D.C. data on the
years preceding and following enactment of the gun bans voided in
Heller. Over the five preban years, D.C.'s murder rate had fallen from
thirty-seven to twenty-seven deaths per ioo,ooo people.34 After fifteen
years under the bans, it had tripled to 80.22 deaths per ioo,ooo people.35
Compare D.C. to neighboring Baltimore, which for years before the
D.C. bans had experienced closely similar murder rates.36 Fifteen years
after the D.C. bans Baltimore's murder rate had increased somewhat but
D.C.'s had so drastically increased as to be almost double Baltimore's.37
Now, compare D.C. to all other large American cities. Before the bans
D.C. ranked fifteenth in large city murder rates."8 Since 1976, D.C.
ranked first or second in murder rates among large American cities in
fifteen years and fourth in four years. Far from the gun bans succeeding,
not once did D.C.'s murder ranking fall below what it had been before
the ban.
32. GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 236 (1997).
33. See Kennedy & Braga, supra note I8.
34. See DisasterCenter.com, District of Columbia Crime Rates i96o-2oo7, httpJ/www.disastercenter.com/
crime/dccrime.htm (last visited June so, 2009).
35- Id.
36. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS
(3d ed. 2010) (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 56 n.I55, on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
37. Id.




We do not insist that D.C.'s catastrophic postban murder history
proves that disarming victims promotes murder. But, as the latest
analysis puts it, "Thirty years after passage, there is no proof that the
D.C. gun ban has reduced violent crime, and no evidence that it has
reduced criminals' access to firearms. If the D.C. gun ban has benefited
D.C., it is unclear how."'' (No greater testament to the bans' catastrophic
failure can be seen than the current assertions of the D.C. legislators who
enacted the ban: that the bans were not enacted to reduce violence, but
rather to spur an expected national or regional handgun ban.))
II. LIMITING THE SECOND AMENDMENT'S SCOPE
A. MODERN THEORISTS' INADEQUATE ATTEMPTS AT LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The scope of the Second Amendment, and its limitations, can only
be understood by reference to its underlying rationale. That rationale is
personal self-defense, which the Founding Fathers and the liberal
political philosophers they revered held to be the first of all natural
rights. "Who," Montesquieu asked, "does not see that self-protection is a
duty superior to every precept?"4 This was a rhetorical question in his
time; it is no longer so today when so many intellectuals passionately
condemn the idea of personal self-defense.43 By contrast, the Founding
Fathers and the natural-rights philosophers they followed (Hobbes,
Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, among others) enthusiastically
embraced the right of personal self-defense. 44 It bears emphasis that self-
defense had a broader meaning than it is usually conceived of having
today. Self-defense included not only defense against apolitical crime but
also against assassination, genocide, and other politically-motivated
oppressions -what Algernon Sidney called "the violence of a wicked
magistrate who, ha[ving] armed a crew of lewd villains," subjects the
people to murder, pillage, and rape.45
40. Robert Endorf, The District of Columbia Gun Ban: Where the Seductive Promise of Gun
Control Meets Reality, 19 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 43, 58 (20O7).
41. Paul Duggan, Crime Data Underscore Limits of D.C. Ban's Effectiveness, WASH. POST, Nov.
13, 2007, at Bi.
42. 2 MONTESQUIEu, THE SPRIrr OF LAWS 6o (Thomas Nugent trans., rev. ed. 1900).
43. For a review of the anti-self-defense ideology that motivates the primary gun control groups
and advocates, see Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1254-59 (1996).
44. See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 90-94 (1992) (quoting Hobbes, Montesquieu, Blackstone, Algernon Sidney, Cesare
Beccaria, and Thomas Paine, among others).
45. 2 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 246 (N.Y., Dear & Andrews
1805). Rape, robbery and murder by individual soldiers (who were, in fact, largely criminals recruited
by jail-sweepings), particularly when billeted upon the king's enemies, was an aspect of English and
French history of which the Founders were all too well aware. Kates, supra note 44, at 99-1Ol. And it
June 2009]
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The Second Amendment guarantees a collateral principle, which the
Founders followed the natural-rights philosophers in deeming
indispensable to this primary right of self-defense: what Blackstone
termed the "auxiliary" right to possess arms.46 Illustrative of the
interrelationship the Founders saw between the right of self-defense and
the right to possess arms is a 1790 lecture by Justice James Wilson. Here
is how Justice Wilson, a law professor, member of the Constitutional
Convention, and the primary author of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
explained the right to use deadly force to repel a homicidal attacker:
[I]t is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have seen,
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any human
institution. This law, however, is expressly recognised in the constitution
of Pennsylvania. "The right of the citizens to bear arms in the defence of
themselves shall not be questioned.""
The Heller majority opinion also cites various nineteenth-century
American writings in which the right to arms was equated to the right to
self-defense from which it was derived."' Interestingly, insofar as modern
philosophers address such issues, almost all concur that the right of self-
defense necessarily implies a right to have a gun.49
Given their background in natural-rights philosophy, the
understanding that the Amendment guarantees a right to possess the
means of self-defense was universal among its authors, their
contemporaries, and later commentators down to the twentieth century."
Only when gun control became a political issue in the twentieth century
did anyone suggest the Second Amendment's purpose had been other or
was an aspect of their own history, the Crown having attempted to enforce the Stamp Tax and other
exactions by soldiers whose invasions of homes and businesses the Founders deemed criminal and
believed had been accompanied by robbery, assault, and rape-wherefore Samuel Adams had called
upon the populace to arm themselves individually for their own defense. Id.
46. See Kates, supra note 44.
47. 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 84 (Bird Wilson ed.,
1804) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting PA. CONST. art. 9, § 21).
48. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2793-94 (2oo8).
49. See Michael Huemer, Is There a Right to Own a Gun?, 29 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 297, 297-99
(2003); Lester Hunt & Todd C. Hughes, The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms, 14 PUB. AFF. Q.
1, 1-25 (2000); Lance Stell, Self Defense and Handgun Rights, 2 J.L. EcoN. & POL'Y 265, 267-77 (2o06);
Samuel C. Wheeler, Arms as Insurance, 13 PUB. AFF. Q. III, III, 123-24 (1999); Samuel C. Wheeler,
Self-Defense Rights and Coerced Risk-Acceptance, Is PuB. AFF. Q. 431, 431 (1997).
50. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an
Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REv. 237, 260, 263 (2004) (noting that, in contrast to Standard Model,
advocates of the various states' right/collective rights theories have been unable to produce even a
single example of those theories being mentioned by any eighteenth-century American); David B.
Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 (1998) (providing a
comprehensive review of a century of post-1789 references to the Amendment which finds none
stating the states' right theory).
[Vol. 6o: 1339
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less than guaranteeing law-abiding, responsible adults a right to arms for
the defense of self, home, and family.5'
In the twentieth century, intellectuals and academics whose attitudes
toward self-defense are diametrically opposite to those of the Founders
felt the need to invent some other purpose for the Amendment. Aware
that its words had to mean something, they desperately strove to concoct
any theory, no matter how baseless, other than the Standard Model. The
resulting theories can be boiled down to three slightly differing ones,
each being equally ahistorical and even absurd.
i. States' Right
The single most popular theory from the middle of the last century
has been that the Amendment was a disavowal of, and retrenchment on,
the military and militia clauses of the original Constitution, intended to
safeguard the states' power over the militia." This has been solemnly
asserted despite-and without ever addressing! -the following problems:
(I) far from wanting to enhance state powers, the Amendment's author,
James Madison, was an extreme exponent of federal power vis-A-vis the
states who deemed the Constitutional Convention a failure for having
rejected his proposals for more sweeping federal sovereignty;53 (2)
Madison expressly informed Congress that his proposal exclusively
concerned individual rights rather than restoring any "powers of the
State Governments; 5 4 (3) the Amendment declares a "right of the
people," a phrase used throughout the Constitution and Bill of Rights to
describe individual rights;55 (4) the Amendment nowhere uses the words
51. As William Van Alstyne jocularly wrote, quoting a preeminent expert on the history of the
Amendment,
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the "collective"
right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right of "the people" to
keep and bear arms. If anyone entertained this notion in the period during which the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of the most closely
guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving from the period
between 1787 and i79I states such a thesis.
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236,
1243, n.i9 (1994) (quoting STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 83 (1984) (emphasis added)). It bears emphasis that the Heller dissents could
produce no eighteenth-century expression of the states' right/collective right theories of the
Amendment.
52. Typical expositions of the states' right theory include: Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis Henigan,
The Second Amendment in the 20th Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 5 (1989); Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107
(I99I); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6 HAMLINE L. REV.
383 (1983). Dennis Henigan is the Director of the Legal Action Project for the Brady Campaign to
Prevent Gun Violence. The Federalist Soc'y, Biographical Information for Dennis Henigan, http://
www.fed-soc.org/debates/id.472/default.asp (last visited June tO, 2009).
53. JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION 143-210 (2007) (discussing Madison and the
Constitutional Convention).
54. i ANNALS OF CONGRESS 450 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
55. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 228 & n.24 (5th Cir. 2001). ("[A]s used
June 20091
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"power" or "authority," which the Constitution invariably uses when
describing government powers16 (5) Anti-Federalists did desire to reduce
federal control over the militia and reinstate state control-for which
purpose they offered the First Congress other constitutional amendments
that the Federalist-majority Senate rejected; 7 and (6) from early in its
history, the Supreme Court has held that federal power over the militia is
plenary, with state authority existing only insofar as consistent with
federal authority.:8 It is little wonder then that, though fervent opposition
to guns and their ownership produced four dissenting votes in Heller, not
one of the Justices deemed the states' right theory credible enough to be
worth espousing. 9
2. Collective Right
This theory asserts that the Amendment grants a "collective right"
in the sense (read: nonsense) of a "right" that cannot be enforced by
anyone either for herself or for the groupio Contrast the "collective"
rights the Constitution does recognize, such as the First Amendment
right to assemble and the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment rights of
particular groups to vote. All these rights can be enforced by people
deprived of them seeking enforcement on their own behalf and/or for the
6,group.
3. "Sophisticated" Collective Right
This theory concedes that the Amendment does create an individual
right to arms but says that right can only be exercised in the context of
military service.62 Justice Stevens's dissent purports to find support for
throughout the Constitution, 'the people' have 'rights' and 'powers,' but federal and state governments
only have 'powers' or 'authority', never 'rights."' (emphasis added)).
56. Id.
57. For Virginia's request to this effect, see 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 66o (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 189I). For North Carolina's identical
request, see 4 id. at 245. Congress's rejection appears in I JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 75 (1789).
58. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 349-50 (i99o) (holding that state militias may be called
into federal service over state objection, and that federal authority over the militia is paramount);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 383 (1918) (holding that Congress has authority to abolish
state militias by bodily incorporating them into federal army); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19,
33 (1827) (noting president's power to call militia from state control into federal service); Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 24 (1820) (holding that federal militia legislation preempts state).
59. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822-47 (2oo8) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 2847-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6o. See Prince, supra note ii, at 694-95 (espousing the collective-right view, which he pithily
describes as asserting that the right to arms the Amendment guarantees applies not to individual
people, but "to the whole people as body politic" (i.e., to no one)).
61. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
62. See, for example, Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and
Deregulation of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57, 64, 66-77, 103-10, 133-45 ('995), which
endlessly stresses that the right the Amendment guarantees is "narrow," a "narrow individual right,"
and is "narrow[ly] focus[ed] on the militia in defining the right to bear arms." This is as close as the
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this by reference to the supposed eighteenth-century meaning of the
Amendment's "keep and bear" phraseology. 6 The majority opinion
pithily disposes of this: "No dictionary has ever adopted that definition
[of 'keep and bear'] and we have been apprised of no source that
indicates that it carried that meaning at the time of the founding."
64
Moreover, to demolish the entire line of argument, it is unnecessary to
do more than inquire what it is supposed to mean-something no
proponent of this theory has ever felt it worthwhile to explain. Consider,
for instance, the belief of many gun-knowledgeable persons that the
military erred in replacing the venerable 1911 Ai .45 pistol with the
lower caliber Beretta M-9 pistol and in adopting the low caliber .223 rifle
instead of its roughly .30 caliber predecessors. 6' Does the "sophisticated"
collective-right theory mean that service members have a right to choose
which guns the state or federal governments procure and issue,
regardless of what their superiors think? 66 And if that is not what it
means, then what does it mean to say that the Amendment creates a
"right" to arms that can only be exercised in the context of military
service? (Note that it cannot mean that gays or others currently excluded
from militia or military service have a right to be included therein. For
the whole point of the sophisticated collective right theory is to claim
that the Amendment does not create a meaningful right, and it does not
give any right to anyone who is not actually serving in the militia or the
military.)
Where would one look to determine the content of this supposed
"right"? Nothing further is required to show that these theories are not
honest or serious attempts to understand the Amendment than that none
of the theories' numerous advocates has ever sought to explore their
meaning or implications beyond just barely enunciating them.
Significantly, the only attempt ever made to analyze what the state- and
collective-right theories might mean is by Standard Model exponents. 7
author gets to explaining what the Amendment does in his view. He offers no example or discussion of
what kind of law might violate this negligible "right." See id. For description of this as the
"sophisticated collective right" view, see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 236 (5th Cir. 2001).
63. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
64. Id. at 2794 (majority opinion). For further discussion of the absurdity of considering "keep
and bear" to be a "unitary phrase," see George A. Mocsary, Explaining Away the Obvious: The
Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76 FORDHAM L. REv.
2113, 2173-74 (2008).
65. IAN V. HOGG & JOHN WEEKS, MILrrARY SMALL ARMS OF THE 20TH CENTURY 79, 179 (6th ed.,
DBI Books i991).
66. Let it be understood that we are raising this issue for the sake of argument, without any
intention of either endorsing or condemning the Armed Forces weaponry choices we have mentioned.
67. Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A
Thought Experiment, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1756-57 (1995).
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To reiterate, these theories are just desperate attempts to concoct
any explanation, no matter how fanciful, as an alternative to the
Standard Model.68
Having outlined the various theories, we may now proceed to discuss
what, if anything, they imply about limitations on the Second
Amendment right to arms.
B. DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT COVER POSSESSION OF THE SUPER-
DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS OF MODERN WARFARE? 69
Only obliviousness to their own theory explains the claims by
champions of the states' right view that the Standard Model entails the
view that individuals have a right to possess cannons, tanks, warships,
weapons of mass destruction, etc. To briefly summarize the matter, of
course a right to arms for personal defense" does not imply a right to
possess the kinds of weapons that are suitable only for warfare, not self-
defense.7 The Standard Model implies no more than that the Second
Amendment guarantees law-abiding, responsible adults the right to
possess ordinary, small arms-handguns, rifles, and shotguns. As the
68. The baselessness and ahistorical absurdity can be illustrated by the heroic obliviousness
opponents of the Standard Model have had to the Amendment's phrase "right of the people." If that
phrase stood alone it would be possible, though very strained, to construe it as creating some kind of
unique collective, non-individual, never-enforceable right. But the phrase appears in both the First and
Fourth Amendments, where it is used to denote individual rights; and "the people" is used in the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to differentiate the rights of individuals from the rights of the states.
Moreover, the slightest research into how late-eighteenth century Americans described
individual rights shows the phrase "right of the people" being routinely used to describe individual
rights. An early Madison draft of the First Amendment read: "The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak." HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 252 (quoting 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9-to (Charlene Bangs Bickford ed.,
1986)). Professor Halbrook cites numerous such examples. See, e.g., id. at 221 ("[T]he People have a
Right peaceably to assemble.., the People have a Right to Freedom of Speech ... the People have a
Right to keep and bear Arms...." (quoting 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CoNSTrrrToN 821 (199o))); id. at 231 ("[Tlhe people have a right to freedom of speech...." (quoting
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
658-59 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES])); id. at 239 ("[Tlhe people have an equal,
natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion .... " (quoting i DEBATES,
supra, at 328)); id. at 257 ("[The Bill of Rights] are calculated to secure the personal rights of the
people...." (quoting CREATING THE BILL OF RIGrrs: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS 249 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., i99I))).
69. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290),
which raised the issue of whether the Amendment invalidates the federal ban on machine guns. It
answered that question in the negative based on the claim that the ban is a reasonable regulation
permitted by the Amendment. Id. Whether or not that position could be sustained, we here present far
more direct and persuasive reasons why the Amendment permits the banning of the super-destructive
weaponry of modem war.
70. For the proposition that personal defense is the rationale of the Amendment, see supra notes
44-5o and accompanying text, especially Kates, supra note 44.
7L. Reynolds & Kates, supra note 67.
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principal exponent of even the NRA's militant version of the Standard
Model puts it:
Since "arms" under the second amendment are those which an
individual is capable of bearing, artillery pieces, tanks, nuclear devices,
and other heavy ordnances are not constitutionally protected. Nor are
other dangerous and unusual weapons, such as grenades, bombs,
bazookas, and other devices which, while capable of being carried by
hand, have never been commonly possessed for self-defense.7
Ironically, this claim by partisans of the states' right view recoils on
their own view.73 If, as they theorize, "the Second Amendment sought to
keep state militias as a viable force in opposing the federal
government,"74 that necessarily implies that states have a Second
Amendment right to possess all the same weapons that the federal
government has. That would include the states' rights to possess-
independent of any kind of federal regulation -nuclear and biological
mass-death weapons and nuclear missile submarines, as well as the right
to raise armies without the consent of Congress. Note that it is irrelevant
under the states'/collective right theories that the original Constitution
forbids states having warships or raising armies.75 After all, insofar as
these theories have any genuine rationale (as opposed to just being a
pretextual alternative to the Standard Model), it is that the Second
Amendment was an Anti-Federalist revision of the original
Constitution's provision for federal military supremacy. In contrast, the
Standard Model says not that the Amendment sought to correct anything
in the Constitution, but only that it guarantees the personal right to arms
that was universally endorsed by late-eighteenth century Americans. 76
Yet, two questions might be asked: First, does the Standard Model
not accept that the Amendment's purposes extend to self-defense not
only against apolitical criminals but against terrorism and genocide by
government as well? And so, second, does that not imply that individuals
may possess at least tanks, artillery, and bombers with which to defend
themselves?
To the first of these questions, the answer is yes; but to the second,
the answer is no. Once again, the arms protected by the Second
72. Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Interpretation of the Second
Amendment, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 159-60 (1986) (footnote omitted).
73. See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, lo6 (6th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that the Standard
Model entails the conclusion that individuals have a right to nuclear weapons); Saul Cornell, The Right
to Bear Bazookas: A New Take on the Second Amendment, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Mar. 19, 2007.
http://hnn.us/articles/3653i.html; see also Michael Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean
Today?, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 291, 297 (2O0O).
74. George C. Thomas, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of
Rights and Criminal Procedure, boo MtcH. L. REV. 145,158 (2001).
75. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 10, cl. 3.
76. Reynolds & Kates, supra note 67, at 1744, 1748-49.
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Amendment are ones akin to those which ordinary people can "keep and
bear" (i.e., small arms, not cannons or tanks). Nor need the citizenry
have the ultradestructive weaponry of modern warfare. Such weaponry is
unnecessary to deter-and, if necessary, defeat-a tyrannical overthrow
of our government. A quarter century ago one of the current Authors
wrote:
The argument that an armed citizenry cannot hope to overthrow a
modern military machine flies directly in the face of the history of
partisan guerrilla and civil wars in the twentieth century. To make this
argument (which is invariably supported, if at all, by reference only to
the American military experience in non-revolutionary struggles like
the two World Wars), one must indulge in the assumption that a
handgun-armed citizenry will eschew guerrilla tactics in favor of
throwing themselves headlong under the tracks of advancing tanks. Far
from proving invincible, in the vast majority of cases in this century in
which they have confronted popular insurgencies, modern armies have
been unable to suppress the insurgents. This is why the British no
longer rule in Israel and Ireland, the French in Indo-China, Algeria
and Madagascar, the Portuguese in Angola, the whites in Rhodesia, or
General Somoza, General Battista, or the Shah in Nicaragua, Cuba
and Iran respectively-not to mention the examples of the United
States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is, of course,
quite irrelevant for present purposes whether each of the struggles just
mentioned is or was justified or whether the people benefited there
from. However one may appraise those victories, the fact remains that
they were achieved against regimes equipped with all the military
technology which, it is asserted, inevitably dooms popular revolt.
Perhaps more important, in a free country like our own, the issue is
not overthrowing a tyranny but deterring its institution in the first
place. To persuade his officers and men to support a coup, a potential
military despot must convince them that his rule will succeed where
our current civilian leadership and policies are failing. In a country
whose widely divergent citizenry possesses upwards of i6o million
firearms [as of 2005 upwards of 280 million firearms], however, the
most likely outcome of usurpation (no matter how initially successful)
is not benevolent dictatorship, but prolonged internecine civil
war .... Even if the general's ambition does not recoil from the
prospect of victory at such a cost, will his officers and men accept it?"
Nothing which has occurred in the world in the quarter century since this
was written has undercut its truth.
Moreover, the fact that the Amendment's guarantee does not extend
to super-destructive military weaponry is evident from its text. Its right is
77. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment,
82 MCH. L. REv. 204, 270-71 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Handgun Prohibition] (footnotes omitted).
For the estimate that American gun ownership now exceeds 280 million guns, see Don B. Kates, The
Limited Importance of Gun Control from a Criminological Perspective, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A
LEGAL BATrLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 62, 63 (Timothy D. Lytton ed.,
2005) [hereinafter Kates, Limited Importance].
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to "keep and bear" arms. Furthermore, the eighteenth-century
understanding of the word "arms" was limited to weapons one could
take in hand."s So the Amendment does not extend to the super-
destructive military weapons the eighteenth century knew: cannons
which Americans could not pick up and carry in their hands. By parity of
reasoning, the Amendment right does not apply to bazookas, stinger
missiles, or other military weapons which resemble cannons in their
indiscriminate destructiveness.
This point is approached by the majority opinion's respectful
observation that from "Blackstone through 19th-century cases,
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose."79
III. ARE HANDGUNS AMONG THE ARMS THE AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES?
A. THE CRIMINOLOGY OF HANDGUNS
In Heller, the District of Columbia, seeking to defend its handgun
ban, argued that widespread possession of handguns represents an
especially serious public safety hazard. 80 So even if the Amendment
protects an individual right (which the District denied), it would not
extend to handguns, which it characterized as "uniquely dangerous
weapons" that present "unique dangers to innocent persons."'8 ' In
support of all this, the District offered two dubious assertions about
modern handguns: that they are both more concealable and far more
deadly than the weaponry that the Founders knew."'
Before treating those points, it may be useful to review some
criminological evidence:
9 Annually, several times as many victims use handguns to defend
against criminals as criminals use handguns to commit crimes
83
and "[riesistance with a gun appears to be most effective in
78. The 1828 edition of Webster's Dictionary defined arms as "any thing which a man takes in his
hand in anger, to strike or assault another." i NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (N.Y., S. Converse 1828). The Oxford English Dictionary ("OED") definitions for
"arms" are more specific than Webster's. See 15 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 634 (J.A. Simpson &
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. r989). But all OED-cited examples of the usage of the word "arms," from
1300 to 1870, conform to the Webster's definition-things which can be taken in the hand. Id. To the
same effect, see the discussion and examples given in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2791 (2oo8).
79. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
8o. Id.
81. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, Helter, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290).
82. See id. at 24-26.
83. Kates, Limited Importance, supra note 77, at 68-69.
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preventing serious injury [to victims, and] ... the data strongly
indicate that armed resistance is the most effective tactic for
preventing property loss. ' 4
" The most charitable criminological appraisal of the District's
1976 handgun ban would be that it has achieved nothing by way
of reducing murder and violence. This is charitable in treating as
a mere coincidence the fact that since D.C. banned the only arms
which place victims (the weak) on a par with aggressors, murder
rates catastrophically increased not only in absolute terms but
also in comparison to neighboring Baltimore and all other large
American cities that did not ban handguns."s
" Russia has banned handguns since the 192os, and, given Russian
methods of law enforcement, the ban has succeeded in largely
eliminating handgun murders. 6 So murderers just use different
instruments, and Russia's murder rate has always been higher
than ours. s7 In recent years it has been almost four times higher.8
" Almost eighty years of increasingly restrictive laws having failed
to prevent increasing violent crime rates, England banned
handguns in 1997, confiscating more than 150,000 previously
legally-permitted handguns."' As of the year 2000, England had
the highest violent-crime rate among industrialized nations.' °
B. THE SUPPOSED DEADLINESS OF MODERN HANDGUNS
One argument for disregarding the Second Amendment as obsolete
is that the technology of firearms has advanced so dramatically since
1791 that a modern pistol provides so much destructive potential that the
Framers, were they present today, would recognize the absurdity of
allowing ordinary law-abiding persons to possess or carry such a weapon.
(Alternatively, it might be argued "that only those arms in existence in
the eighteenth century are protected by the Second Amendment" - a
claim that the Heller majority considered but dismissed as "bordering on
the frivolous."'9 )
84. Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the Outcome
of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 86I, 902 (2004); see also Lawrence Southwick Jr., Self-Defense with Guns:
The Consequences, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 351, 362 (2000) ("The use of a gun by the victim significantly
reduces her likelihood of being injured.").
85. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text for statistics.
86. Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide? A
Review ofInternational and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 649, 650-51 (2007).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 655.
9o. Id.
9i. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008).
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As an old adage has it, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing."
Among the more problematic aspects of the debate over guns is that
people in general, and particularly gun-control advocates, have both little
accurate information about guns and much misinformation. This is the
only way to account for claims that modern firearms are far more deadly
than the firearms of the eighteenth century."
While the power of firearms has expanded substantially since the
eighteenth century, this is not the only technology that has changed.
Medical care, policing, and communications technology have far more
than kept pace with firearms technology. This leads to the
counterintuitive result that at least in a civil society, firearms are
substantially less deadly today than in the Founders' era. To understand
this, consider the following:
Suppose that in 1791 a lunatic on a balcony in a crowded mall had
fired both barrels of a Io-gauge shotgun into the shoppers below. If the
ninety missiles thus dispatched had struck ninety shoppers, 6o% or more
of those who received a substantial wound in the head or torso would
have died, given eighteenth-century medical technology. 9 Now suppose
the same scenario today but with the killer using the 15-shot 9mm
semiautomatic handgun standardized by the U.S. Armed Forces as the
Beretta M-99 and reloading with five extra 15-shot magazines. First of
all, before the killer had emptied even his first magazine, most of his
targets would have fled for cover. But let us assume that the crowd
instead obligingly stood still so he could change magazines five times and
shoot ninety of them. Of those ninety wounded, fewer than fourteen
would die, given modern medical technology.' 5
The example is macabre, but the lesson is clear. Our Founding
Fathers, fervently believing self-defense to be the first human right, were
willing to tolerate weaponry far more deadly in the eighteenth century
than are handguns in the twenty-first century.
C. THE SIZE AND CARTRIDGE CAPACITY OF MODERN HANDGUNS
Firearms technology has certainly advanced since 1791 -but not as
much as some seem to think. The concept of a repeating handgun was
92. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 Cm.-KENT
L. REV. 103, 110 (2o01) ("[E]ighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as threatening or lethal as
those available today....").
93. Telephone Interview with Martin Fackler, M.D., Colonol, U.S. Armed Forces (July 26, 20o8).
94. See Military Analysis Network, M9 9mm Beretta Pistol/Personal Defense Weapon, http://
www.fas.org/man/dod-loi/sys/land/m9.htm (last visited June 1O, 2009).
95. Telephone Interview with Martin Fackler, supra note 93. Colonol Fackler is an experienced
battle surgeon, coauthor of the NATO Wound Manual, and directed the U.S. Armed Forces Wound
Ballistics Laboratory until his retirement. Id. As of the late twentieth century, handgun wounds killed
roughly 15% of those wounded. See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a
Deterrent to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, i8 AM. J. Cram. L. 113, 136 n.72 (1991).
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already more than a century old in 1791, if still unrefined. 6 Even with
respect to single-shot pistols, the technological advance since the late
eighteenth century is less dramatic than it first appears. Pocket pistols of
the Revolutionary era were often surprisingly compact, such as this
example owned by Paul Revere:
FIGURE I: PAUL REVERE'S POCKET PISTOL'
Being so compact, those who were expecting trouble might carry
two, four, or even six single-shot pistols on their belt. This was a
sufficiently common practice that pistols were often sold (or stolen) inpairs98 and sometimes as a case of pistols or a brace of pistols." The
phrase "brace of pistols" frequently appears in eighteenth-century
documents to describe this solution to the single-shot problem."'°
96. Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and Public: Safety in Early
America, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 699,716 (2OO8).
97. Photograph by Author at Massachusetts Historical Society.
98. For purchase records, see Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, 1740-1744,
reprinted in 42 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 63 (Bernard Christian Steiner ed., Md. Historical Soc'y 1923)
(1885), available at http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc29o8/oooool/oooo42/html/am42--
63.html; I CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, 1652-1781, PRESERVED IN
THE CAPITOL AT RICHMOND 81 (William P. Palmer ed., 1875). For stolen pairs of pistols listed in
runaway ads, see S.C. GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 1740; PA. GAZETTE, May 24, 1733; PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 1752;
PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 25, 1753; PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 1754; PA. GAZETTE, Aug. 1O, 1774; PA. GAZETTE, May
10, 1775; Supplement, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1767; PA. GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 178o; PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 5,
1781; PA. GAZETTE, May 19, 1784; PA. GAZETTE, June 27, 1787; Virginia Runaways: Runaway Slave
Advertisements from 18th-Century Virginia Newspapers, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/costa-
browse?id=r37o41298 (last visited June sO, 2009). For ads offering pairs of pistols for sale, see PA.
GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 1749; PA. GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 1751; PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 1761; PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 21,
1762; Supplement, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1774; PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 15, 1776; PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 24,
1778.
99. PA. GAZETTE, Oct. I, 1761; PA. GAZETTE, Sept. I, 1779.
Ioo. See ROBERT BiSsET, DOUGLAS, OR, THE HIGHLANDER 189 (T. Crowder ed., 18oo); I MATTHEW
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A criminal carrying six single-shot pistols in his pockets and on his belt
in 1791 would admittedly not be as quick to fire those six shots as his 2007
counterpart using a revolver or semiautomatic pistol. A reasonably skilled
wielder of a modem pistol could expect to accurately shoot perhaps twenty
to forty bullets in about sixty to ninety seconds (assuming that the shooter
reloads without being shot by a bystander). The 1791 equivalent might fire
six bullets in about ten seconds. This is an order of magnitude
enhancement in the ability to wound.
On the other side of the equation, advances in medical,
communication, and protective technology have more than kept pace with
the improvement in handgun technology. As we have seen, in 1791 a torso
or abdominal wound guaranteed death in the majority of cases. '
Improvements in surgical technique and the ability to rapidly move victims
to a hospital have also dramatically improved the chances of surviving
gunshots. The development of full-time, professional police departments
and the ubiquity of cell phones means that criminal misuse of firearms
today is often met by an organized and effective response far more rapidly
than in 1791. The improvements in firearms technology also means that
civilians carrying concealed handguns have commensurately escalated
their ability to respond to a criminal attack.
D. AMERICAN PISTOL REGULATION BEFORE THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Reviewing colonial laws and contemporary utterances, historian
Robert Churchill concludes that late-eighteenth-century Americans had a
right to keep arms which they saw as a vital and inviolable incident of their
citizenship.' 2 But what about pistols? Did the Framers mean to include
pistols in "the right of the people to keep and bear arms"? What were their
attitudes toward what the District of Columbia's brief in Heller
characterized as such "uniquely dangerous" weapons?'" Could it perhaps
be that pistols were so scarce that the Framers simply overlooked the
supposedly unique public safety hazard they represented?
GREGORY LEWIS, THE MONK: A ROMANCE 203 (1796); JASPER SPRANGE, THE TUNBRIDGE WELLS GUIDE,
OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE ANCIENT AND PRESENT STATE OF THAT PLACE 251 (1797); Account of the Disaster
That Befell His Majesty's Ship Guardian, Lieutenant Riou, Commander, in THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR
A VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLInCS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1790, at 254, 260 (J. Dodsley ed.,
1793); Some Account of the Loss of the Hartwell East-Indiaman, in THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A VIEW
OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1787, at 252, 253 (J. Dodsley ed., 1789); PA.
GAZETTE, May 20, 1756.
to. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. Robert H. Churchill, Once More unto the Breach, Dear Friends, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 205,
2o8-12 (2007).




There are almost no regulatory distinctions between pistols and long
guns in statutes before 1791. '04 The only examples of laws that treat
pistols differently from other arms suggest that pistols were regarded as
either less dangerous than long guns or, perhaps, that they enjoyed some
protected status as weapons of self-defense. 5 In January of 1776, the
Maryland Revolutionary government ordered those not prepared to
associate with the Revolutionary cause to turn over their firearms for the
use of the militia-with one notable exception.' The counties were told
to order all freemen to "deliver to the committee of observation for this
county, all his fire-arms, if he hath any, except pistols."'" Even with all the
concerns about Loyalists who might take advantage of the arrival of
British troops to cause mischief, there was apparently no perceived need to
disarm them of pistols. A similar exception allowing those not entirely
trusted with long guns-but trusted with pistols- occurred in Maryland as
late as 178I. I 8
Why were pistols not more heavily regulated? As one of the Authors
has demonstrated in another forum, the evidence from advertising,
probate inventories, and official records shows that pistols were widely
owned before, during, and after the Revolution, and that they were
commonly used in self-defense, in violent crime, and for suicide.'" While
less common, gun accidents appear repeatedly in this period."' None of
these uses, either intentional or accidental, seems to have been treated as
startling or shocking, although the consequences were often tragic."'
In sum, the Amendment's wording ("arms") seems to embrace
handguns no more or less than any other kind, and there is simply no
evidence to suggest any contrary intent.
104. See Cramer & Olson, supra note 96, at 703. See generally CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED
AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF How AND WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE (2006).
105. Cramer & Olson, supra note 96, at 704.
io6. Id.
107. Id. (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND, HELD AT THE
CITY OF ANNAPOLIS, IN 1774, 1775 & 1776 (1836), reprinted in 78 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 75, 110 (2OOO),
available at http://aomol.net/megafile/msa/SPecc/SCc2900//SC29o8/ooooI/ooo'78/pdf/am78--75.pdf).
io8. HANSON'S LAWS OF MARYLAND 1763-1784 (787), reprinted in 203 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 278
(zooo), available at http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc29oo/sC29o8/oooooI/oo2o3/html
am23--278.html.
1o9. Cramer & Olson, supra note 96, at 76-16.
1Io. Id. at 712.
i I1. Id. at 711.
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IV. THE SPECTER OF GUNS FOR CRIMINALS, CHILDREN, AND THE
IRRESPONSIBLE
A. AMERICAN VERSUS FOREIGN LAWS BARRING GUN OWNERSHIP
An endlessly repeated truism has it that American gun laws are far
less restrictive than those of Europe."2 But it is a truism that simply is not
true."3 Consider the issue of firearms ownership by persons who have
previously been convicted of a serious crime. Under German law they are
barred from possessing a firearm for ten years."4 But only those who have
been convicted of gun crimes, or crimes in which a victim was seriously
injured, are banned for life from possessing a firearm."5
In contrast, American federal law imposes a lifetime bar to firearms
ownership on those convicted of any of the countless state or federal
felonies including nonviolent ones such as tax evasion, antitrust violations,
and violations of various record-keeping laws."6 Persons who have been
involuntarily committed to mental institutions also are barred for life,"7
and juveniles are barred from purchasing guns until they reach the age of
majority.",8
These prohibitions raise at least an apparent problem given the
wording of the Amendment: "the right of the people to keep and bear
arms.""' Obviously criminals, the mentally ill, and children are "people."
Does Heller lead to the conclusion that they have a right to arms?
B. Do CRIMINALS, THE MENTALLY ILL, OR CHILDREN HAVE A RIGHT TO
ARMS?
To this question it might at first blush seem possible to respond with
an unqualified negative. In classical republican thought, the right to arms
was inextricably and multifariously linked to that of civic virtu (i.e., the
virtuous citizenry).'2"
112. PETE SHIELDS, GUNS DON'T DIE-PEOPLE Do 6o-69 (i98I).
113. See Don B. Kates, Gun Laws Around the World: Do They Work?, AM. GUARDIAN, Oct. 1997,
available at http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?ID=72.
114. Waffengesetz [Weapons Act], Oct. 16, 2002 BGBI. I at 3973, § 5(0) (F.R.G.).
115. Id. § 5(2).
ii6. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2oo6). Some federal and state felonies criminalize conduct that is both
trivial and presents no danger to others. See infra Part IV.C.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
118. Id. § 922(b)(I). But parents are free to purchase firearms for their children to use.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
120. See, e.g., Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 492 (2004) ("Historians have long recognized that
the Second Amendment was strongly connected to the republican ideologies of the Founding Era,
particularly the notion of civic virtue."); Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 77, at 231-33 ("[Tlhe
ideal of republican virtue was the armed freeholder...."); Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in
the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128 (1986) (discussing how "the virtuous citizen"
was understood "in terms of his possession of arms and his self-reliant willingness to use them in
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One implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen is that the
right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e.,
criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are
deemed incapable of virtue.'2 '
Moreover, from time immemorial, various jurisdictions recognizing a
right to arms have nevertheless taken the step of forbidding suspect groups
from having arms.'22 American legislators at the time of the Bill of Rights
seem to have been aware of this tradition of excluding criminals and other
suspect persons from the right to arms. Thus, during the Massachusetts
debate on ratifying the original Constitution, Samuel Adams proposed a
bill of rights including a provision stating that Congress could not "prevent
the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping
their own arms.'
2 3
Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the Founding
Fathers would have deemed persons convicted of any of the common law
felonies not to be among "the [virtuous] people" to whom they were
guaranteeing the right to arms.2 4 At common law, felons were essentially
stripped of property and other rights: "A felon who had broken the social
contract no longer had any right to social advantages, including transfer of
defense of self, liberty, and property").
12I. See State v. Hirsch, 34 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("Felons simply did not fall within
the benefits of the common law right to possess arms. That law punished felons with automatic
forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by death." (quoting Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra
note 77, at 266)); cf. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 480 (noting that felons did not historically have a right
to possess arms).
122. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 59-61 (1989) (Maryland disarming Catholics); HALBROOK, supra
note 51, at 96-98 (American state prohibitions of arms to black people); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT I1 (1994) (disarmament of English and
Welsh Catholics); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of
Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983) ("Colonial and English societies of the eighteenth
century, as well as their modem counterparts, have excluded infants, idiots, lunatics, and felons [from
possessing firearms].").
123. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 181 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Anti-Federalist minority in the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention urged that the Constitution be amended to provide "no law shall be passed for
disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from
individuals." Id. at 182. See also the exclusion from the right to arms in the language proposed by the
New Hampshire ratifying convention. Id. at 181.
124. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226-27 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Stephen P.
Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms," 49 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 16I (1986)) (citing numerous authorities to the fact that "violent criminals,
children, and those of unsound mind" were never seen as having a right to arms).
For different perspectives, see Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory:
District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1371 (2009); C. Kevin
Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695 (2009).
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property....',, A felon "could not own any property himself, nor could
[his heirs] claim through him.",,2
6
From the foregoing, it seems that neither Congress nor state
legislatures are precluded from treating dangerous criminals, the mentally
unbalanced, and juveniles as differing from the virtuous citizenry to whom
the Amendment guarantees the right to arms. Indeed, Congress and
various state legislatures have effectively done that. Federal law prohibits
selling a firearm to anyone who has been convicted of any felony
whatsoever,"7 or of a misdemeanor of domestic violence, 's or involuntarily
committed to a mental institution;'29 persons in those categories are barred
for life from firearm possession, as are persons dishonorably discharged
from the military.3' While there are some differences, almost all states
have roughly the same prohibitions.'3 '
Insofar as such exclusions from the right to arms have been litigated,
they have been upheld.'32 Over forty state constitutions now guarantee
individuals the right to arms and these have uniformly been held to allow
bans on gun ownership by suspect groups.'33 Akhil Amar observes that the
Founders viewed the right to arms as inextricably linked with the right to
vote as incidents of full citizenship: those who were armed were entitled to
vote and those who voted were entitled to bear arms."M Thus it is
particularly relevant to note that the right to vote may constitutionally be
denied to convicted criminals' and the insane., 6 By parity of reasoning it
125. Vernon M. Winters, Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough" Justice
Is Not Enough, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 457 (1987).
126. 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 69 (3d ed. 1923).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I) (2006).
128. Id. § 922(g)(9).
129. Id. § 922(g)(4).
130. Id. § 922(g)(6).
131. See JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 32-34 (2002).
132. See, e.g., Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W. 3 d 170, 181 (Ky. 2006).
133. See, e.g., id. at 177-78; State v. Hirsch, 34 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (felons,
children, and the insane are not part of the virtuous citizenry to whom the right to arms is limited).
134. AKHIL REED AMAR & LES ADAMS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS PRIMER: A CITIZEN's GUIDEBOOK TO THE
AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 87-88 (2002).
135. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (974); see also DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. I44,
i6o (196o) (felons may be prohibited from holding union offices).
136. See JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 154
(2007). The Framers seem to have been remarkably unconcerned about the mentally ill having access
to firearms. Some of this may have been because commitment procedures were quite informal in the
Colonial period, and those who were perceived as dangerous (the "furiously insane") could be, and
were, locked up without benefit of hearing. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 39-43 (2d ed. 1949); GERALD N. GROB,
MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875, at 39-47 (1973).
A second factor that may explain the lack of concern is that Colonial America's population was
overwhelmingly located in small towns or on farms. See ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, ACTUAL
GOVERNMENT AS APPLIED UNDER AMERICAN CONDITIONS 181 (3d ed. 19io). In a small town, everyone
knew everyone else, and if Mr. Jones or Mrs. Smith occasionally acted oddly, it was not a surprise.
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seems clear that persons convicted of serious criminal offenses may be
prohibited from possessing guns.
C. TRIVIAL FELONY AS A BASIS FOR EXCLUSION FROM THE RIGHT TO ARMS
At early common law, the term "felony" applied only to a few very
serious, very dangerous offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and robbery.
As centuries went by, Parliament legislated more and more capital
offenses, some involving trivial thefts. While capital punishment is no
longer involved, American state and federal law continues to criminalize
many trivial matters as felonies.
Indeed some things are classified as felonies that should not be
punished at all and constitutionally cannot be so.'3 Scores of civilian
offenses, many of them posing no physical danger to others, are felonies.
For instance, income tax evasion, antitrust law violations, and, in
California at least, knowingly marrying a person who is already married,' 3s
are felonies. Acts deemed crimes by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ") include adultery,'39 sodomy,'4" and, for officers, fraternizing
with enlisted personnel. 4 ' Expressing contempt for a superior (including
the President),' disrespect,' malingering (calling in sick when you are
not)," desertion,' insubordination, and disobedience to orders'47 are
also crimes. All of these are either felonies or penalized by dishonorable
Everyone in town knew Mr. Jones or Mrs. Smith well enough to know what they might do-and would
probably keep deadly implements away from someone regarded as dangerous. A mentally ill person
who was violent or suicidal might be locked up; those whose behavior was abnormal but peaceful
would create no fear. GROB, supra, at 37.
A third factor is that mental illness was relatively scarce in Colonial America. E. FULLER TORREY
& JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 194
(2oo1). A recent study of mental illness data shows that psychosis rates rose quite dramatically
between 18o7 and 1961 in the United States, England and Wales, Ireland, and the Canadian Atlantic
provinces. Id. A study of Buckinghamshire, England, shows that there was more than a ten-fold
increase in psychosis rates from the beginning of the seventeenth century to 1986. Id. at 121-23, 298-
99.
137. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (ruling that consensual adult homosexual
sex is constitutionally protected) with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6605 (2004) (punishing oral or anal
intercourse, or sex with animals, with not less than five years in prison).
13 8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 284 (West 20o8).
139. See sO U.S.C. § 934 (2oo6).
I4O. Id. § 925.
141. See id. § 934. See generally Walter T. Cox, III, Consensual Sex Crimes in the Armed Forces: A
Primer for the Uninformed, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 791 (2007) (article by military judge
discussing the prosecutions of sex crimes in the armed forces).
142. Io U.S.C. § 888.
143. Id. § 889.
144. Id. § 915.
145. Id. § 885.
146. Id. § 8 9 1.
147. Id. § 89o.
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discharge, which in itself bars the discharged person from acquiring or
possessing a firearm.' 48
For civilians, Lawrence v. Texas pretty well settles that consensual sex
of any kind between spouses, or between consenting adults of any marital
status, is a constitutionally protected activity.'49 But even were a
prohibition on such activity valid,' it would be next to absurd to suggest
that conviction of a "felony" in which untold millions of Americans
routinely engage could disqualify them from the right to arms now that the
constitutional status of that right has been recognized. Equally absurd
would be any claim that income tax evasion, antitrust law violations, or
(however appropriately punishable it might be in a military situation),
calling George W. Bush a jackass should disqualify anyone from owning a
firearm. Insofar as federal or state statutes would seek to bar arms
possession by such "felons," those laws would seem to be invalid on their
face.
Yet, just as clearly, some kinds of prior felonious activity indicate a
proclivity to dangerous lawlessness and so should disqualify one from
possessing firearms for a number of years or even life. The commission of
crimes like rape, robbery, burglary, arson, or other felonies of violence to
the person or which endanger persons-kidnapping, maiming, attempted
murder, and aggravated assault suggest themselves -should disqualify the
offender from firearms ownership, probably for life. Moreover there are
felonies which, though nonviolent, are so grossly aberrant to responsible
behavior that conviction for them may indicate propensities rendering the
offender not trustworthy to have a firearm. One such felony might be
driving while under the influence of inebriants (including even lawfully
possessed drugs). Embezzlement and grand larceny are two other
examples that readily come to mind.
Thus, it would seem appropriate for Congress or state legislatures to
enact statutes specifically enumerating a variety of serious crimes from
whose commission it is reasonably deducible that a person who has been
convicted of them should not possess arms. Perhaps there should be a
permit process that would limit the duration of the firearms disability for
some offenses. A teetotaler who at age twenty had been convicted of
reckless or inebriated driving might nevertheless be issued a permit at age
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(6). The UCMJ does not divide crimes into felonies and misdemeanors,
but convictions may be treated as either, based on civilian definitions. These include the standard that
any crime for which one year or more confinement is a possible punishment is a felony. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559(a); U.S. COAST GUARD ACADEMY, COMMAND AND OPERATIONS SCHOOL LEGAL DESK REFERENCE
172 (2003) (quoting U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5520.5E), available at
httpJ/www.cga.edu/uploadedFlesfLDC/PCOXO-Course Materials/Legal%2oDesk%
2oReference%2oLCDR.pdf.
149. 539 U.S. 558,578 (20o3).
150. Military courts have held that consensual sexual "crimes" are still crimes and thus subject to
punishment. Cox, supra note 141, at 798-99.
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forty after *two decades of blameless conduct and complete abstention
from drink.
V. DISARMING GROUPS BASED ON RACE OR RELIGION
The tradition whereby suspect groups can be denied the right to arms
includes arms bans directed against groups defined by race or religion.
Thus, the English Bill of Rights' right-to-arms guarantee was expressly
limited to Protestants.'5 ' Does this suggest that Congress or a state
legislature could similarly ban firearms ownership? For example, in
responding to extremist riots and terrorist activity such as have recently
occurred in England, France, Denmark, and elsewhere,'52 could Congress
or a state legislature ban firearms ownership by Muslims?
Before addressing the legal implications, it is useful to point out that
such a ban would be counterproductive. Our knowledge of terrorist
intentions has come in large part from information volunteered to the FBI
and local authorities by law-abiding, moderate Muslims.'53 Not only would
a discriminatory ban on firearms ownership by Muslims anger the Muslim
community in general, it would leave law-abiding, moderate Muslims, who
reported extremist plots, defenseless against retaliation by the extremists.
At the same time it would do nothing to disarm the extremists. Even
ardent gun-control advocates concede that gun laws cannot disarm
terrorists and professional criminals.'54
151. Kates, Limited Importance, supra note 77, at 239. Throughout the pre-Civil War period,
Southern states prohibited the possession of arms by black people, whether slave or free. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Mayor of Savannah, I Ga. 68. 72 (Ga. 1848) ("Free persons of color have never been
recognized here as citizens; they are not entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or
to hold any civil office.")
152. See Associated Press, London Observes Anniversary of Subway Bombings, USA TODAY, July
7, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2oo6-07-o7-london-anniversary-x.htm; Molly Moore, As
Youth Riots Spread Across France, Muslim Groups Attempt to Intervene, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at
At, available at http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2oo5/II/4/AR oo5ii4ooi83.html;
Julien Spencer, Republished Danish Cartoon of Prophet Muhammad Ignites Tensions, CHRISTiAN SCl.
MONITOR, Feb. 19, 2oo8, http://www.csmonitor.coM/2oo8/o219/p99soi-duts.html.
153. The following partial list is from the website Muslims for a Safe America:
A White Muslim informant, William 'Jamaal' Chrisman, helped convict an African-
American Muslim, Derrick Shareef, who pled guilty to plotting to attack a Rockford, IL
shopping mall with hand grenades. "What brought me to the government was after 9-I1
Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said it was incumbent on Muslims to stop
terrorists," Chrisman testified. "Anyone involved in terrorism was deemed the brother of
the devil."
Muslims for a Safe America, Should American Muslims Work as Government Informants? (Nov. II,
2oo8), http://muslimsforasafeamerica.org/?p=7i. "An Egyptian-American Muslim informant, Osama
Eldawoody, helped convict an Egyptian-American Muslim in NY, James Elshafay, and a Pakistani
Muslim immigrant, Shahawar Matin Siraj, of conspiring to blow up a NY subway station." Id. "A
Yemeni Muslim informant, Mohamed Alanssi, helped convict an African-American Muslim in NY,
Tariq Shah, of pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda and offering to train Al Qaeda members in martial arts
and hand-to-hand combat." Id.
154. Editorial, Controlling Guns, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1981, at 14 (antigun editorial nevertheless
conceding that "no amount of control will stop a determined assassin-or a determined street
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Indeed, three recent general studies confirm that gun bans simply do
not control or reduce criminal behavior. In 2004, the National Academy of
Sciences released an evaluation based on its review of 253 journal articles,
ninety-nine books, forty-three government publications, and some
empirical research of its own.' 5 It could not identify any gun control that
had reduced violent crime, suicide, or gun accidents., 6 Neither could a
2003 evaluation of then-extant studies by the Centers for Disease Control("CDC"). 157
In 2007, Canadian criminologist Gary Mauser and one of the
Authors of this Article published a study that included a comparison of
firearms ownership and murder rates for all European nations for which
the data were available. It turned out that the average murder rate for
the nine nations with very low gun ownership (less than 5000 guns per
ioo,ooo population) was three times higher than the average murder rate
of the seven nations with high gun ownership (more than I5,OOO guns per
ioo,ooo population).'5 Although this result might seem anomalous, the
anomaly is easily explained. Nations faced with sharply-rising criminal
violence enact gun bans as a quick-fix solution. But because (by
definition) gun bans disarm only the law-abiding, the violent crime rates
just keep rising. Violent crime comes to be disproportionately associated
with nations which have few guns overall. These nations have drastically
decreased the overall number of guns because the law-abiding disarm in
response to the ban. But violent crime remains unaffected because those
inclined to engage in it illegally retain their guns.'59 Consider in this
respect
patterns of African-American homicide. Per capita, African-American
murder rates are [six to eight times] higher than the murder rate for
whites. If more guns equal more death, and fewer guns equal less, one
might assume gun ownership is higher among African-Americans than
robber-from getting a gun"); Richard Harding, Firearms Ownership and Accidental Misuse in South
Australia, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 271, 272 (1978) (political criminals cannot be disarmed); Franklin Zimring,
Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 722 (1968) (professional
criminals cannot be disarmed).
155. FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004).
156. Id. at 6.
157. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIRST REPORTS EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS LAWS (2003), available at http://cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm. Predictably, given the CDC's ardent support for gun control, it
explained the result by asserting that the scores of studies it evaluated were inadequate. See id.
158. See Kates & Mauser, supra note 88, at 652 tbl.i, 675 tbl.3 .
159. For instance, in 1997 rising violence despite ever-more-restrictive gun laws prompted England
to ban and confiscate all legally owned handguns. Don B. Kates, The Hopelessness of Trying to Disarm
the Kinds of People Who Murder, 12 BRIDGES 313,317-18 (2005). In the ensuing years English violence
rose to double American rates; the English police intelligence appraisal is that "[Alnyone who wishes
to obtain a firearm [illegally] will have little difficulty in doing so." Id. at 318-19 (alteration in original)
(quoting Guns, Crack, and Child Porn- UK's Growing Crimes, REuTERs, July 22, 2002).
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among whites, but in fact African-American gun ownership is
markedly lower than white gun ownership.
... Whatever their race, ordinary people simply do not murder.
Thus preventing law-abiding, responsible African-Americans from
owning guns does nothing at all to reduce murderers [sic], because they
are not the ones who are doing the killing. The murderers are a small
minority of extreme anti-social aberrants who manage to obtain guns
whatever the level of gun ownership in the African American
community.'"
By parity of reasoning, prohibition of guns to the Muslim community
would disarm only the great law-abiding majority, not the few violent
extremists.
Regardless of its criminological merits, would a ban on gun possession
by Muslims or other racial or religious groups be constitutional? As noted,
in the long tradition of the right to arms, such bans have often existed.'
6
,
On the other hand, as far as the Second Amendment goes, the preceding
proposals that excluded suspect groups focused on criminals or
revolutionaries and did not contemplate that the right would be denied to
ordinary law-abiding, responsible adults on the basis of their religion or
race.62 Indeed, Madison's notes on his proposal contrasted it to the
English Bill of Rights, which guaranteed arms only to Protestants.' 63 Note
also that in his Dred Scott opinion, Chief Justice Roger Taney made it
clear that only by embracing the (today) abhorrent notion that black
people were per se inferior to Americans of other races could laws against
their possessing guns be deemed valid. ' 64
16o. Kates & Mauser supra note 88, at 676-77 (footnotes omitted) (citing JoycE LEE MALCOLM,
GUNS AND VIOLENCE: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE 232-33 (2002); Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence,
Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 21 (1996)); see also GARY KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS 70 (I997); Lor, supra note 36, at 39 ("[Wjhite gun ownership exceed[ed] that for
blacks by about 40 percent in 1996...."); CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV. Div., FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2007 (2oo8), http://www.fbi.govlucr/cius2oo7/offenses/expanded-informationldata
shrtable oi.html (tabulating 7316 black murder victims and 6948 white murder victims in 2007); U.S.
Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, http:l/quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ooooo.html (last
visited June 10, 2009) (showing that black persons make up 12.8% of the U.S. population and that
whites persons (including Hispanics) make up 8o% of the U.S. population). Calculating victim rates
based on these figures by race yields 2.86 white victims per ioo,ooo population, and 18.8o black victims
per ioo,ooo population.
161. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
I63. Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 77, at 237 n.s44. The same contrast was made by
Madison's colleague St. George Tucker in the earliest legal commentary on the Second Amendment.
See I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINA app. at 300 (Dennis & Co. 1965) (1803).
164. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417, 451-52 (1856); see also Mocsary,
supra note 64, at 2136 n.i88 (discussing the lengths to which Chief Justice Taney went to deny arms to
freed slaves by disavowing their personhood).
[Vol. 6o: 1339
CRIMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Moreover, the Second Amendment is to be construed in tandem with
the rest of the Constitution. While those who detest firearms often seem to
perceive them as legally sui generis, the guarantees of freedom of religion
and of due process and equal protection do not contain any special "gun
exception."" Taking those guarantees in tandem with the Second
Amendment, it would seem that no level of government could prohibit
gun ownership by whole groups defined by their race or religion.'1
CONCLUSION
The Second Amendment reflects the Founding Fathers' accurate
perception that banning guns to the general populace is counterproductive,
indeed oxymoronic. Those who will flout such basic admonitions as "thou
shalt not kill" also flout gun laws. So such laws disarm only the law-
abiding, whose gun ownership is not a problem. This is doubly
counterproductive: First, it deprives victims of the only means of self-
defense with which the weak can defeat predation by the strong.61 Second,
it diverts scarce law enforcement resources away from the very difficult
task of trying to control the lawless to the useless task of trying to deny
victims the means of self-defense.
In fact, one perception underlying the Second Amendment was that
the Founders also saw gun bans as counterproductive and oxymoronic.
That was the view of the liberal Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria ("the
father of criminology"'68), whose words Jefferson laboriously copied into
his handbook of great quotations:'6
It is a false idea of utility to sacrifice a thousand real advantages for the
sake of one disadvantage which is either imaginary or of little
consequence; this would take fire away from men because it burns and
water because it drowns people; this is to have no remedy for evils
except destruction. /Laws forbidding people to bear arms are of this
165. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (I999) (unanimously rejecting Florida's suggestion to
adopt a "gun exception" to the Fourth Amendment).
t66. The Equal Protection Clause is nominally addressed only to the states. But Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 50o (I953), held that its principles are embraced by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, which is addressed to the federal government. Due Process includes "the rights to acquire,
enjoy, own and dispose of property." Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 544 (197)
(quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, in (1948)).
167. See Linda Gorman & David B. Kopel, Self-Defense: The Equalizer, 15 F. APPLIED RES. & PUB.
POL'Y 92, 92 (2OOO) ("Only a gun can allow a I lo-pound woman to defend herself easily against a 200-
pound man."); cf. Kates, Limited Importance, supra note 77, at 70 ("A gun is the only mechanism that
gives a weaker victim parity with an attacker (even if the attacker also has a gun). The next best
alternative, a chemical spray, is ineffective against precisely those who are most likely to engage in
violent attacks: people who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol or who are extremely angry.").
As to the ineffectiveness of chemical sprays, see, for example, James B. Jacobs, The Regulation of
Personal Chemical Weapons: Some Anomalies in American Weapons Law, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 141,
143 (990).
I68. FRANK E. HAGAN, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY 119 (6th ed. 2007).
169. HALBROOK, supra note 3, at 132.
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nature; they only disarm those who are neither inclined nor
determined to commit crimes. On the other hand, how can someone
who has the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity and
the most important ones in the statute books be expected to respect
the most trifling and purely arbitrary regulations that can be broken
with ease and impunity and that, were they enforced, would put an end
to personal liberty-so dear to each man, so dear to the enlightened
legislator-and subject the innocent to all the vexations that the guilty
deserve? Such laws place the assaulted at a disadvantage and the
assailant at an advantage, and they multiply rather than decrease the
number of murders, since an unarmed person may be attacked with
greater confidence than someone who is armed. These laws should not
be deemed preventive, but rather inspired by a fear of crime. They
originate with the tumultuous impact of a few isolated facts, not with a
rational consideration of the drawbacks and the advantages of a
universal decree./' 71
The same view was held by Jefferson's contemporaries, such as
Thomas Paine, who observed:
[T]he peaceable part of mankind will be continually overrun by the vile
and abandoned while they neglect the means of self
defence .... [S]ince some will not [disarm], others dare not lay them
aside .... Horrid mischief would ensue were one half the world
deprived of the use of them; for while avarice and ambition have a
place in the heart of man, the weak will become a prey to the strong."'
Yet nothing in this implies that there is a right for either criminals or
the irresponsible to possess arms, or that the state should allow them to do
so. Difficult though it may be to enforce laws against their possession of
arms, such laws may occasionally prove useful.'72
In sum, there is no reason to doubt the validity or value of reasonable
and carefully drafted federal or state laws prohibiting previously convicted
criminals, juveniles, and the mentally unbalanced from possessing
170. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 73 (David Young trans., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1986) (1764) (footnote omitted). As to the widespread influence of Beccaria on late-eighteenth
century American thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin, see
CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AUTHOR OF AMERICA 39-40 (2o05).
171. I THE WRmNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 56 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., AMS Press, Inc. 1967)
(1894).
172. See WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, SHOTS IN THE DARK: THE POLICY, POLITICS, AND SYMBOLISM OF GUN
CONTROL 166-69 (200O). Vizzard is a career agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (BATFE), turned criminologist. Id. at ix. He provides an example from his years as a
BATFE supervising agent: Two longtime felons with prior murder and other felony convictions "were
stopped by California highway patrol officers for speeding. The officers observed blood on the
subjects' clothing .. " Id. at 166. A search of the trunk revealed
clothing soaked with human blood, an assault rifle, and a pistol. Imbedded in the frame of
the pistol were bits of human flesh. Although subsequent investigation by homicide
investigators and ATF agents, working under my supervision, never located a victim, both
subjects received sentences of approximately 20 years in federal prison for firearm
possession [by a felon which is a federal crime].
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firearms. Nor does the Amendment foreclose bans on possession of
bombs, biological weapons, and the other ultradestructive weapons of
modem warfare, which are not suitable for individual self-defense.
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